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1. Introduction 
Ranking Lorenz curves in accordance with first-degree Lorenz dominance means that the higher of 
non-intersecting Lorenz curves is preferred. The normative significance of this criterion follows from 
the fact that the higher of two non-intersecting Lorenz curves can be obtained from the lower Lorenz 
curve by means of rank-preserving income transfers from richer to poorer individuals, which means 
that the criterion of first-degree Lorenz dominance is consistent with the Pigou-Dalton principle of 
transfers. When one Lorenz curve lies above another Lorenz curve, the higher Lorenz curve therefore 
displays less inequality than the lower Lorenz curve. However, since Lorenz curves may intersect, 
which is often the case in applied research, other approaches than first-degree Lorenz dominance are 
needed to reach conclusions.  
 
Although the theoretical literature offers more general dominance criteria for ranking Lorenz curves,1 
these methods are generally viewed as hard to implement and the results difficult to interpret because 
they involve assumptions about third and higher derivatives (see e.g. Atkinson, 2003). Thus, most 
empirical studies rely exclusively on one or a few summary measures of inequality to achieve rankings 
of intersecting Lorenz curves. A concern is, however, that the conclusions reached are sensitive to the 
more or less arbitrary choice of inequality measures. It is, therefore, due time to start bridging the wide 
gap between the theoretical and the empirical strand of the literature concerned with rankings of 
intersecting Lorenz curves. That is the focus of this paper.  
 
Generalized Lorenz dominance approach. As demonstrated by Aaberge (2009)  two alternative 
dominance criteria emerge as attractive generalizations of first-degree Lorenz dominance; one that 
aggregates the Lorenz curve from below (second-degree upward Lorenz dominance) and the other that 
aggregates the Lorenz curve from above (second-degree downward Lorenz dominance). Since first-degree 
Lorenz dominance implies second-degree upward as well as downward Lorenz dominance, it follows that 
both methods preserve first-degree Lorenz dominance and thus are consistent with the Pigou-Dalton 
principle of transfers.  
 
However, the transfer sensitivity of these criteria differ in the sense that second-degree upward Lorenz 
dominance place more emphasis on transfers occurring in the lower rather than in the upper part of the 
income distribution, whereas second-degree downward Lorenz dominance is most sensitive to transfers 
                                                     
1 See e.g. Kolm (1976), Shorrocks and Foster (1987), Davies and Hoy (1995), Zoli (1999) and Aaberge (2000, 2009). 
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that occur in the upper part of the income distribution. This means that the criterion of second-degree 
upward Lorenz dominance requires a transfer of money from a richer to a poorer person to be more 
equalizing the lower it occurs in the income distribution, provided that the proportion of individuals 
between the donors and receivers is fixed. By contrast, the criterion of second-degree downward Lorenz 
dominance requires this type of transfer to be more equalizing the higher it occurs in the income 
distribution.  
 
For situations where neither upward nor downward Lorenz dominance provide unambiguous rankings of 
Lorenz curves, Aaberge (2009) introduced two hierarchical sequences of Lorenz dominance criteria and 
moreover explored what restrictions various Lorenz dominance criteria place on the weight-functions of 
the general Mehran-Yaari family of rank-dependent measures of inequality. Furthermore, by introducing 
appropriate general principles of transfer sensitivity, Aaberge (2009) demonstrated that these criteria can 
be given a normative justification.  
 
Inequality measures approach. An alternative and more common strategy for achieving rankings of 
intersecting Lorenz curves is to apply summary measures of inequality, which explains why numerous 
alternative measures of inequality are introduced in the literature. The most widely used measure of 
inequality is the Gini coefficient, which is equal to twice the area between the Lorenz curve and its 
equality reference. But since no single measure can reflect all aspects of inequality exhibited by the 
Lorenz curve, the importance of using alternative measures to the Gini coefficient is universally 
acknowledged.  
 
As proposed by Mehran (1976), we may use weighed sums of the income share deviations as 
alternative rank-dependent measures of inequality to the Gini coefficient. The family of rank-
dependent measures of inequality, which includes the Gini coefficient, can alternatively be expressed 
as a weighted area between the Lorenz curve  ( )L u  and its equality reference (u). The chosen 
specification of the rank-dependent weight-function, which may be considered as the preference 
function of a social planner, clarifies whether concern about inequality is particularly related to the 
lower, the central or the upper part of the income distribution. Thus, the functional form of the weight-
function exhibits the inequality aversion profile of the corresponding measure of inequality. Roughly 
speaking, we may say that a rank-dependent measure of inequality exhibits downside inequality 
aversion when the weight-function gives more emphasis to the deviation between the Lorenz curve 
and its equality reference, ( )u L u , for small u than for large u. By contrast, when the weight-
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function gives more weight to the deviation ( )u L u  for large u than for small u, we may say that the 
corresponding inequality measure exhibits upside inequality aversion. 
 
Theoretical contributions. The purpose of the theoretical part of this paper is to characterize the 
relationship between dominance criteria and measures of inequality and explore what restrictions various 
Lorenz dominance criteria place on the weight-functions of two alternative generalized Gini families of 
rank-dependent measures of inequality, as well as to provide a normative justification of these criteria by 
relying on appropriate general principles of transfer sensitivity introduced by Aaberge (2009). As is 
demonstrated in Section 2, second-degree Lorenz dominance forms a natural basis for the construction 
of two separate hierarchical sequences of partial orderings (dominance criteria), where one sequence 
places emphasize on changes that occur in the lower part of the Lorenz curve whereas the other places 
emphasize on changes that occur in the upper part of the Lorenz curve. Both sequences of dominance 
criteria turn out to depart from the Gini coefficient; one requires higher degree of downside inequality 
aversion and the other higher degree of upside inequality aversion than what is exhibited by the Gini 
coefficient. This means that that the Gini coefficient in general favors neither the lower nor the upper 
part of the Lorenz curves. Section 2 further shows that if we restrict the ranking problem to Lorenz 
curves with equal Gini coefficients, second-degree upward and downward dominance coincide in the 
sense that a Lorenz curve L1 that second-degree upward dominates a Lorenz curve L2 is always 
second-degree downward dominated by L2. Moreover, Section 2 clarifies the relationship between 
ordering conditions for the Gini coefficient and the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality in 
the case of singly intersecting Lorenz curves. 
 
As demonstrates in Section 3, the hierarchical and nested structure of the dominance criteria allow us 
to identify the lowest degree of dominance required to reach unambiguous rankings of Lorenz curves. 
Moreover, Section 3 shows that the two hierarchical sequences of Lorenz dominance criteria can be 
used to divide two generalized Gini families of rank-dependent measures of inequality into two 
corresponding hierarchical systems of nested subfamilies that offer two different inequality aversion 
profiles; one exhibits successively higher degrees of downside inequality aversion whereas the other 
exhibits successively higher degrees of upside inequality aversion. Since the criteria of Lorenz 
dominance provide convenient computational methods, these results will be used to identify the largest 
subfamily of the generalized Gini families and thus the least restrictive social preferences required to 
reach unambiguous ranking of any given set of Lorenz curves. From the weight-functions of these 
inequality measures, we obtain intuitive interpretations of higher degree Lorenz dominance, which 
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generally has been viewed as difficult to interpret. By doing so, we connect the dominance and the 
inequality measures approach to the ranking of intersecting Lorenz curves.  
 
Empirical application. The evolution of earnings and income inequality in developed countries over 
the last few decades is one of he most extensively researched topics in economics. In a widely cited 
review of the literature, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) conclude that earnings and income inequality 
increased in most OECD countries during the 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, they argue that many 
countries with fairly low levels of inequality experienced some of the largest increases in inequality. 
These conclusions rest on numerous empirical studies relying exclusively on one or a few summary 
measures of inequality, like the Gini coefficient. A concern is, however, that the conclusions reached 
are sensitive to the more or less arbitrary choice of inequality measure.  
 
Section 4 examines the time trend in income and earnings inequality of Norwegian males during the 
period 1967-2005, showing how the dominance and the inequality measures approach to the ranking 
of intersecting Lorenz curves can be combined in a coherent way in empirical analysis. First, we 
identify the lowest degree of dominance, and thus the least restrictive social preferences, required to 
reach unambiguous rankings of the Lorenz curves over this period. Second, we pin down the largest 
subfamily of the generalized Gini families that is consistent with the actual ranking of these Lorenz 
curves. Finally, to ease the interpretation of the inequality aversion exhibited in the dominance results, 
we compute the weight-functions of these inequality measures.   
2. The relationship between Lorenz dominance and the Gini 
coefficient 
The Lorenz curve L for a cumulative income distribution F with mean  is defined by 
(1) 1
0
1( ) ( ) , 0 1,
u
L u F t dt u
     
where  1( ) inf : ( )F t x F x t    is the left inverse of F. Thus, the Lorenz curve L(u) shows the share 
of total income received by the poorest 100 u per cent of the population. 
 
Under the restriction of equal mean incomes, the problem of ranking Lorenz curves formally 
corresponds to the problem of choosing between uncertain prospects. This relationship has been 
utilized by e.g. Atkinson (1970) to characterize the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves in the 
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case of distributions with equal mean incomes. This was motivated by the fact that in cases of equal 
mean incomes the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves is equivalent to second-degree stochastic 
dominance2, which means that the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves obeys the Pigou-Dalton 
principle of transfers. The Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers states that an income transfer from a 
richer to a poorer individual reduces income inequality, provided that their ranks in the income 
distribution are unchanged. 
 
To perform inequality comparisons with Lorenz curves we can deal with distributions with equal 
means, or alternatively simply abandon the assumption of equal means and consider distributions of 
relative incomes. The latter approach normally forms the basis of empirical studies of income 
inequality. 
 
The standard criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves, called first-degree Lorenz dominance, is 
based on the following definition.3   
 
Definition 2.1 A Lorenz curve L1 is said to first-degree dominate a Lorenz curve L2 if 
  1 2( ) ( ) for all 0,1L u L u u   
and the inequality holds strictly for some 0,1 .u  
 
A social planner who prefers the dominating one of non-intersecting Lorenz curves favors transfers of 
incomes which reduce the differences between the income shares of the donor and the recipient, and is 
therefore said to be inequality averse.  
 
In order to examine the relationship between various Lorenz dominance criteria and the measurement 
of inequality, we will rely on the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality4, defined by 
(2) 
1 1
1
0 0
1( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )PJ L P u d L u P u F u du
      ,  
                                                     
2 For a proof see Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1934) or Atkinson (1970). 
3 Note that most analyses of Lorenz dominance apply a definition that excludes the requirement of strict inequality for some 
u. 
4 Mehran (1976) introduced the JP-family by relying on descriptive arguments. For alternative normative motivations of the 
JP-family and various subfamilies of the JP-family we refer to Donaldson and Weymark (1980), Weymark (1981), Yaari 
(1988) and Aaberge (2001). 
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where L is the Lorenz curve of the income distribution F with mean , and the weight-function P  is 
the derivative of a continuous, differentiable and concave function P defined on the unit interval where 
(0) 0P   and (1) 1P  . To ensure that JP has the unit interval as its range, the condition (1) 0P   is 
imposed on P. As demonstrated by Yaari (1987, 1988) and Aaberge (2001), the JP-family represents a 
preference relation defined either on the class of distribution functions (F) or on the class of Lorenz 
curves (L), where P can be interpreted as a preference function of a social planner. The preference 
function P assigns weights to the incomes of the individuals in accordance with their rank in the 
income distribution. Therefore, the functional form of P reveals the attitude towards inequality of a 
social planner who employs JP to judge between Lorenz curves. The most well-known member of the 
JP-family is the Gini coefficient, which is obtained by inserting for 2( ) 2P u u u   in (2).  
 
As demonstrated by Yaari (1988), the JP-family of inequality measures characterizes the condition of 
first-degree Lorenz dominance when the functional form of the preference function P is being strictly 
concave. This means that JP satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers for concave P-functions. 
To deal with situations where Lorenz curves intersect a weaker principle than first-degree Lorenz 
dominance is called for. To this end it is normal to employ second-degree upward Lorenz dominance 
defined by 
 
Definition 2.2 A Lorenz curve L1 is said to second-degree upward dominate a Lorenz curve L2  if  
  1 2
0 0
( ) ( ) for all 0,1
u u
L t dt L t dt u    
and the inequality holds strictly for some 0,1u . 
 
The term upward dominance refers to the fact that the Lorenz curves are aggregated from below.5 The 
aggregated Lorenz curve can be considered as a sum of weighted income shares, where the weights 
decrease linearly with increasing rank of the income receiver in the income distribution. Thus, a social 
planner who prefers the second-degree upward dominating of two intersecting Lorenz curves pays 
more attention to inequality in the lower than in the upper part of the income distribution. As proposed 
by Aaberge (2009), an alternative ranking criterion to second-degree upward Lorenz dominance can 
be obtained by aggregating the Lorenz curve from above.  
                                                     
5 Note that second-degree upward Lorenz dominance is equivalent to a normalized version of third-degree inverse stochastic 
dominance introduced by Muliere and Scarsini (1989). 
9 
Definition 2.3 A Lorenz curve L1 is said to second-degree downward dominate a Lorenz curve L2  if  
      1 12 11 ( ) 1 ( ) for all 0,1
u u
- L t dt - L t dt u    
and the inequality holds strictly for some 0,1u . 
 
Note that both downward and upward Lorenz dominance of second degree preserve first-degree 
Lorenz dominance, since first-degree Lorenz dominance implies second-degree upward as well as 
second-degree downward Lorenz dominance. Consequently, both dominance criteria are consistent 
with the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. The choice between second-degree upward and 
downward Lorenz dominance clarifies whether or not equalizing transfers between poorer individuals 
should be considered more important than those between richer individuals.  
 
As recognized by Muliere and Scarsini (1989), there is no simple relationship between third-degree 
stochastic dominance and second-degree upward Lorenz dominance, but second-degree upward 
Lorenz dominance is equivalent to third-degree upward inverse stochastic dominance. Thus, a general 
characterization of second-degree Lorenz dominance or third-degree inverse stochastic dominance in 
terms of ordering conditions for the utilitarian measures introduced by Kolm (1969) and Atkinson 
(1970) cannot be obtained. By contrast, the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality, defined 
by (2), forms a convenient basis for judging the normative significance of second-degree and higher 
degrees of Lorenz dominance. 
 
To judge the normative significance of criteria for ranking intersecting Lorenz curves, more powerful 
principles than the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers are needed. To this end, Kolm (1976) 
introduced the principle of diminishing transfers, which for a fixed difference in income considers a 
transfer from a richer to a poorer person to be more equalizing the further down in the income 
distribution it takes place.6 As indicated by Shorrocks and Foster (1987) and Muliere and Scarsini 
(1989), the principle of diminishing transfers is, however, not consistent with second-degree upward 
Lorenz dominance.  
 
Mehran (1976) introduced an alternative version of the principle of diminishing transfers by 
accounting for the difference in the proportion of individuals between donors and recipients of the 
                                                     
6 For a formal definition, see Kolm (1976). 
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income transfers, rather than for the difference in income. This principle, denoted first-degree 
downside positional transfer sensitivity (DPTS) by Aaberge (2009), proves to characterize second-
degree upward Lorenz dominance. By contrast, a social planner who considers a given transfer of 
money from a richer to a poorer person to be more equalizing the higher it occurs in the income 
distribution, provided that the proportions of the population located between the receivers and the 
donors are equal, favors the principle of first-degree upside positional transfer sensitivity (UPTS). The 
UPTS characterizes second-degree downward Lorenz dominance. To ensure equivalence between 
second-degree upward Lorenz dominance and JP-measures as decision criteria, Aaberge (2009) proved 
that it is necessary to restrict the preference functions P to be concave with positive third derivatives.7 
By contrast, the condition of negative third derivative of P yields second-degree downward 
dominance. 
 
An inequality averse social planner that supports the criterion of second-degree upward Lorenz 
dominance will act in line with the principle of first-degree DPTS and assign more weight to changes 
that take place in the lower part of the Lorenz curve than to changes that occur in the upper part of the 
Lorenz curve. By contrast, the criterion of second-degree downward Lorenz dominance emphasizes 
changes that occur in the upper part of the Lorenz curve. Thus, an inequality averse social planner who 
employs the criterion of second-degree downward Lorenz dominance acts in favor of the Pigou-Dalton 
principle of transfers and the principle of first-degree UPTS. 
 
Since the third derivative of the P-function that corresponds to the Gini coefficient is always equal to 
0, the Gini coefficient neither preserves second-degree upward Lorenz dominance nor second-degree 
downward Lorenz dominance apart from the case when the inequality in Definitions 2.3A and 2.3B 
holds strictly for 1u   and 0u  , respectively.8 Thus, the suggestion of Muliere and Scarsini (1989) 
that the Gini coefficient is coherent with second-degree upward Lorenz dominance requires a 
definition of second-degree Lorenz dominance that abandons the condition of strict inequality (for 
some 0,1u ). However, by assuming that the Lorenz curves cross only once the following results 
hold.9 
 
                                                     
7 Aaberge (2000) demonstrated that JP defined by (2) satisfies Kolm's principle of diminishing transfers under conditions that 
depend on the shape of the preference function P as well as on the shape of the income distribution F. 
8 Aaberge (2000) gave an alternative interpretation of this property by demonstrating that the Gini coefficient attaches an 
equal weight to a given transfer irrespective of where it takes place in the income distribution, as long as the income transfer 
occurs between individuals with the same difference in ranks. 
9 Zoli (1999) provided a result similar to Proposition 2.1A for singly intersecting generalized Lorenz curves under the 
condition of equal means. 
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Proposition 2.1A. Assume that L1 and L2 are singly intersecting Lorenz curves and L1 crosses L2 
initially from above, and let  1G L  and  2G L  be the two corresponding Gini coefficients. Then the 
following statements are equivalent, 
(i)      for all such that ( ) 0, ( ) 0 and ( ) 0 for all 0,1P 1 P 2J L < J L P P u P u P u u        
(ii)    1 2G L G L . 
 
(Proof in Appendix) 
 
Proposition 2.1B. Assume that L1 and L2 are singly intersecting Lorenz curves and L2 crosses L1 
initially from above, and let  1G L  and  2G L  be the two corresponding Gini coefficients. Then the 
following statements are equivalent, 
(i)      for all such that ( ) 0, ( ) 0 and ( ) 0 for all 0,1P 1 P 2J L < J L P P u P u P u u       
(ii)    1 2G L G L . 
 
The proof of Proposition 2.1B can be achieved by following the line of reasoning used in the proof of 
Proposition 2.1A. Note that Proposition 2.1A can be considered as a dual version of the results of 
Shorrocks and Foster (1987) and Dardanoni and Lambert (1988) that clarify the relationship between 
third-degree (upward) stochastic dominance ordering conditions for the coefficient of variation and 
transfer sensitive measures of inequality. Proposition 2.2 gives results for the case of equal Gini 
coefficients. In this case, second-degree upward and downward Lorenz dominance “coincide” in the 
sense that a Lorenz curve L1 that second-degree upward dominates a Lorenz curve L2 will always be 
second-degree downward dominated by L2. Thus, L1 can be attained from L2 by transfers that obey the 
principle of first-degree DPTS, whereas L2 can be attained from L1 by transfers that obey the principle 
of first-degree UPTS. 
 
Proposition 2.2. Let L1 and L2 be Lorenz curves with equal Gini coefficients. Then the following 
statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 second-degree upward dominates L2 
(ii) L2 second-degree downward dominates L1 
(iii)    1 2P PJ L J L  for all P with ( ) 0 ( ) 0P u and P u    being such that JP obeys the 
principle of first-degree DPTS. 
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(iv)    2 1P PJ L J L  for all P with ( ) 0 ( ) 0P u and P u    being such that JP obeys the 
principle of first-degree UPTS. 
 
(Proof in Appendix). 
3. The relationship between general criteria of Lorenz dominance 
and generalized Gini families of inequality measures  
To deal with situations where second-degree (upward or downward) Lorenz dominance does not provide 
unambiguous ranking of Lorenz curves, Aaberge (2009) introduced two hierarchical sequences of nested 
Lorenz dominance criteria that proved to divide the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality 
(2) into two corresponding hierarchical systems of nested subfamilies. In this section, we use these 
results to divide two generalized Gini families of rank-dependent measures of inequality into two 
corresponding hierarchical systems of nested subfamilies that offer two different inequality aversion 
profiles; one exhibits successively higher degrees of downside inequality aversion whereas the other 
exhibits successively higher degrees of upside inequality aversion. As explained in Aaberge (2009), 
application of the criteria of upward Lorenz dominance requires social preferences with higher degree of 
aversion to downside inequality the higher is the degree of upward Lorenz dominance. A similar 
relationship holds between downward Lorenz dominance and aversion to upside inequality aversion. The 
highest degree of downside inequality aversion is achieved when focus is exclusively turned to the 
situation of the worst-off income recipient. Thus, the most downside inequality averse JP-measure that is 
obtained as the preference function approaches 
(3) 
0, 0
( )
1, 0 1,d
t
P t
t
      
can be considered as the JP-measure that exhibits the highest degree of downside inequality aversion. 
Inserting (3) in (2) yields 
(4) 
1(0 )( ) 1 .
dP
FJ L 
     
Hence, the inequality measure 
dP
J  corresponds to the Rawlsian maximin criterion. As 
dP
J  is 
compatible with the limiting case of upward Lorenz dominance, the Rawlsian (relative) maximin 
criterion preserves all degrees of upward Lorenz dominance and rejects downward Lorenz dominance. 
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By contrast, the JP-measure that is obtained as P approaches10 
(5) 
1, 0 1
( )
0, 1,u
t
P t
t
      
exhibits the highest degree of upside inequality aversion. Inserting (5) in (2) yields 
(6) 
1(1)( ) 1 .
uP
FJ L 

    
Thus, 
uP
J , which we will denote the relative minimax criterion, is “dual” to the Rawlsian (relative) 
maximin criterion in the sense that it is compatible with the limiting case of downward Lorenz 
dominance. When the comparison of Lorenz curves is based on the relative minimax criterion, the 
preferred Lorenz curve is the one for which the largest relative income is smallest. The only transfers 
that decrease inequality are those from the richest unit to anyone else. 
 
As will be demonstrated below, the extreme inequality aversion measure (4) is associated with the 
extended Gini family of inequality measures introduced by Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and 
Yitzhaki (1983). This family is defined by  
(7)      1 1 1
0 0
( 1)( ) 1 1 1 ( ) 1 1 ( ) , 1.i ii
iG L i i u L u du u F u du i

             
In order to introduce an alternative “generalized” Gini family of inequality measures, Aaberge (2000, 
2007) draws on the practice from the statistical literature as motivation for using the moments of the 
Lorenz curve as a basis for defining the Lorenz family of inequality measures11   
(8)    1 1 1
0 0
1( ) 1 1 ( ) 1 1 ( ) , 1,2,...i ii
iD L i u L u du u F u du i
i

         ,  
which is associated with the relative minimax criterion (6). Note that 1 1D G  is equal to the Gini 
coefficient. As was demonstrated by Aaberge (2007), the Lorenz family of inequality measures 
 : 1,2,...iD i   uniquely determines the Lorenz curve. Thus, we can, without loss of information, 
                                                     
10 Note that the normalization condition P'(0)=1 is ignored in this case. 
11 The Lorenz family of inequality measures proves to be a subclass of the "illfare-ranked single-series Ginis" discussed by 
Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and Bossert (1990). 
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restrict the examination of inequality in an income distribution F to the family  : 1,2,...iD i   of 
inequality measures. 
 
As shown by the following expression 
(9)    
1
( ) 1 1 ( 1) 1 ( ) , 1,2,...
1
i
k
i k
k
i kG L i D L i
k k
          .  
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the Lorenz family and the integer subfamily 
 ( ) : 1,2,...,iG L i r  of the extended Gini family of inequality measures. Thus, the extended Gini 
subfamily  ( ) : 1,2,...,iG L i r  is uniquely determined by the corresponding Lorenz subfamily 
 ( ) : 1,2,...,iD L i r  for any integer r. Note that expressions (7) and (8) show that Gi places more 
weight on changes in the lower and Di on changes in the upper part of the Lorenz curve as i increases.  
 
Based on Theorems 3.1 A, 3.1B, 3.2A and 3.2B in Aaberge (2009), we shall now demonstrate how the 
various Lorenz dominance criteria can be applied to evaluate the ranking properties of the Lorenz and 
the extended Gini families of inequality measures. Note that  0iG :i   is a subfamily of JP formed by 
the following family of P-functions, 
(10) 11 ( ) 1 (1 ) , 0.
k
kP t t k
      
Differentiating P1k defined by (10), we find that 
(11) 
1 1
( )
1
( 1)!( 1) (1 ) , 1,2,..., 1
( 1)!( )
0 , 2, 3,...
j k j
j
k
k t j k
k jP t
j k k
            
  
As can be observed from (11) the weight function P1k of the extended Gini family of inequality 
measures is a member of the family 1
*
iP  (and 
**
1iP ) in Aaberge (2009) for , 1,...k i i  . Thus, we get 
the following result from Theorem 3.2A of Aaberge (2009),12 
 
                                                     
12 Muliere and Scarsini (1989) gave an alternative proof of Corollary 3.1A  
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Proposition 3.1. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then  
(i) L1 ith-degree upward dominates L2 
implies 
(ii)    1 2 for 1 2k kG L < G L k = i,i + ,i + ,...  
 
Equation (11) implies that 1 ( ) 0kP t   for all 0,1t  when 0k   and thus that the Gk-measures satisfy 
the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers for 0k  . Moreover, 1 ( ) 0kP t   for all 0,1t  when 1k  . 
Hence all Gk for 1k   preserve second-degree upward Lorenz dominance. Further, the derivatives of 
Pk alternate in sign up to the ( 1)thk   derivative and ( )1 (1) 0jkP   for all j k . Thus, it follows from 
Theorem 3.2A of Aaberge (2009) that Gk preserves upward Lorenz dominance of degree k and obeys 
the principles of DPTS up to and including ( 1)thk  -degree. The highest degree of downside 
inequality averse behavior occurs as k  , which corresponds to the inequality averse behavior of 
the Rawlsian (relative) maximin criterion. Thus, Gk satisfies all degrees of upward Lorenz dominance 
as k  . At the other extreme, as 0k  , the preference function 0 ( )P t t , which means that 0PJ  
does not obey the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers or any principle of DPTS. The stated properties 
of the Gk-measures are summarized in the following proposition, 
 
Proposition 3.2. The extended Gini family of inequality measures defined by (7) has the following 
properties, 
(i) Gk preserves upward Lorenz dominance of degree k and all degrees lower than k, 
(ii)  Gk obeys the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers for 0k  , 
(iii) Gk obeys the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and the principles of DPTS up to and 
including  1 thk   degree for 1k  , 
(iv) The sequence  kG approaches 0  as 0k  . 
(v) The sequence  kG  approaches the Rawlsian relative maximin criterion as k  . 
 
Note that P1k has negative derivatives (of any order) when 0 1k  . Thus, Gk for 0 1k   preserves 
downward Lorenz dominance of all degrees. 
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As demonstrated by Aaberge (2000), the Lorenz family of inequality measures is a subfamily of JP 
formed by the following family of P-functions, 
(12)   12 1( ) 1 , 1,2,...kkP t k t t kk       
Differentiating P2k defined by (24) yields 
(13) 
 
     ( ) 12
1 1 , , 1
( )
1 1 2 .... 2 , 2,3,..., 1
0 , 2, 3,...
k
j
k jk
k t j
k
P t
k k k k j t j k
j k k
 
             
  
By noting from (13) that the weight-function P2k of the Lorenz family of inequality measures is a 
member of  the family *2iP  in Aaberge (2009) for , 1,...,k i i   we obtain the following result from 
Theorem 3.2B of Aaberge (2009), 
 
Proposition 3.3. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then  
(i) L1 ith-degree downward dominates L2 
implies 
(ii)    1 2 for 1 2k kD L < D L k = i, i + , i + ,....  
and 
-1 -1
1 2
1 2
(1) (1)F F< .   
 
The results of a similar evaluation of the Lorenz family of inequality measures as that carried out for the 
extended Gini family are summarized in the following corollary. 
 
Proposition 3.4. The Lorenz family of inequality measures defined by (8) has the following properties, 
(i) Dk  preserves downward Lorenz dominance of degree k and all degrees lower than k, 
(ii) Dk obeys the Pigou-Dalton  principle of transfers for 0k  , 
(iii) Dk obeys the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and the principles of UPTS up to and 
including  1 thk   degree for 1k  , 
(iv) The sequence  kD approaches 0  as k  . 
(v) The sequence  1kkD   approaches the relative minimax criterion as k  . 
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Note that the derivatives of P2k alternate in sign when 1 1k   . Thus, Dk for 1 1k    preserves 
upward Lorenz dominance of all degrees and approaches the Rawlsian relative maximin as k 
approaches -1. As demonstrated by Aaberge (2000), Dk approaches the Bonferroni coefficient as 
0k  . 
 
Proposition 3.1 shows that the various degrees of upward Lorenz dominance are preserved by sub-
families of the extended Gini measures of inequality, which divide the integer subscript subclass of the 
extended Gini family into nested subfamilies. Thus, the hierarchical sequence of nested upward 
Lorenz dominance criteria offers a convenient computational method for identifying the largest 
subfamily of the integer subscript extended Gini family of inequality measures that is consistent with 
the actual ranking of Lorenz curves. As demonstrated by Proposition 3.2, the various degrees of 
downward Lorenz dominance divide the Lorenz family of inequality measures into a similar sequence 
of nested subfamilies.  
4.  Empirical Application: Income and Earnings Inequality in 
Norway, 1967-2005 
Below, we combine the dominance and inequality measures approach to examine the time trend in 
income and earnings inequality of Norwegian males during the period 1967-2005.  
 
Data. Our data are based on administrative registers from Statistics Norway covering the entire 
resident population in Norway between 1967 and 2004. The unique individual identifier allows 
merging information about individual characteristics, like age, with data on annual income and 
earnings taken from tax registers in each year. In the analysis, we employ two measures of income. 
First, we use a measure of annual pre-tax income including all taxable income after deductions. 
Secondly, we use a measure of earnings including all market income, from wages and self-
employment. Individuals with missing observation on income or earnings are excluded. In each year 
1967-2004, we include the entire population of males aged 20-65 who were alive and resident in that 
year. The reason for focusing on males is their role of breadwinner and primary wage-earners over 
most of this period.  
 
It should be noted that we in the empirical analysis exclude individuals with incomes lower than the 1 
percentile or higher than the 99 percentile, to avoid crossing of Lorenz curves due to measurement 
error and noise at the tails of the distributions.    
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Empirical results.  Figure 1 reports Gini coefficients for income and earnings, suggesting that Norway 
has experienced a large increase in inequality since the early 1980s, like most other OECD countries. 
Both income and earnings inequality decrease in the first period until the early 1980s, bottoming out at 
a level below .24. The trends then turn sharply upwards, approaching .32 in the early 1990s. While 
income inequality increase further, earnings inequality stabilizes over the last decade – a likely reason 
is the large increase in capital income in the upper part of the income distribution during this period 
(Aaberge and Atkinson, 2009). It should be noted that the spike in inequality in the early 1990s was 
associated with a tax-reform, and that inequality is likely to have increased more steadily in the 
absence of this reform (see e.g. Fjærli and Aaberge, 2000). The same is true for the year 2005, when 
another tax-reform was implemented.  
 
Figure 1. Gini-coefficient in income and earnings, 1970-2005 
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A concern with the above conclusions is they might be sensitive to the arbitrary choice of inequality 
measure. In Table 1, we therefore report dominance results for the Lorenz curves in income and 
earnings for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2005. To ease the interpretation of the inequality aversion 
exhibited in the dominance results, Table 2 computes the weight-functions of the two different 
generalized Gini families of inequality measures according to their relationship to Lorenz dominance 
of various degrees. Specifically, Table 2 reports the ratios of the weights of the median individual 
compared to the 1 percent poorest, the 5 percent poorest, the 30 percent poorest, the 30 percent richest, 
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and the 5 percent richest. We immediately see that the extended Gini family of inequality measures, Gk 
defined by (7), becomes increasingly sensitive to transfers that occur in the lower rather than the upper 
part of the distribution, as k increases. It is also evident that the Lorenz family of inequality measures, 
Dk defined by (8), becomes increasingly sensitive to transfers that occur in the upper rather than the 
lower part of the distribution, as k increases. Hence, the choice between upward and downward 
dominance depends on to what extent equalizing transfers between poorer individuals should be 
considered more important than those between richer individuals.  
 
Consider first Panel 1 in Table 1, where 1970 is used as the base-year. We see that first degree 
dominance is sufficient to rank 1970 as more equal than 2000 and 2005, both for earnings and income. 
As stated above, first-degree dominance implies that all inequality measures that obey the Pigou-
Dalton principle of transfer yield an unambiguous ranking of these Lorenz curves. However, when 
considering the years 1980 and 1990 more general dominance criteria are required.  
 
For example, when focusing on earnings we see that upward dominance of second degree is necessary 
to consistently rank 1970 as more equal than 1990, and further that upward dominance of (at least) 22 
degree is required to unambiguously rank 1970 as more equal than 1980. From Proposition 3.1 we 
know that upward dominance of second degree implies that Gk will consistently rank 1970 as more 
equal than 1990 for k greater or equal to 2. And further, that Gk will consistently rank 1970 as more 
equal than 1980 for k greater or equal 22. Table 2 shows that the weight-function associated with G22 
implies an extreme degree of downside inequality aversion, whereas G2 is more sensitive to income 
differences in the central and upper part of the distribution. For instance, while G2 assigns about twice 
as much weight to the 30 percent poorest compared to the median individual, G22 weights the former 
individual 1640 times more than the latter individual. Hence, far more restrictive social preferences are 
required to unambiguously rank 1970 and 1980 compared to 1970 and 1990 according to upward 
dominance.   
 
Turing attention to downward dominance in earnings, we see that the picture is reversed:  1970 is 
actually dominated by 1980 and 1990 of second and seventh degree, respectively. This illustrates that 
a consistent ranking of 1970, 1980, and 1990 depends crucially on the choice between upward and 
downward dominance criteria, that is, to what extent concern about inequality is particularly related to 
inequality in the lower, the central or the upper part of the distribution. From Proposition 3.3 we know 
that downward dominance of second degree implies that Dk will consistently ranks 1980 as more equal 
than 1970 for k greater or equal to 2, and 1990 as more equal than 1970 for k greater or equal to 7.  
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From the weights-functions displayed in Table 2, we see that D7 exhibits considerably more upside 
inequality aversion than D2. Consequently, less restrictive social preferences are required to 
unambiguously rank 1970 and 1980 compared to 1970 and 1990 according to downward dominance.  
 
Moving on to Panel 2, we see that 1980 first-degree dominates 1990, 2000, and 2005 for earnings, 
Hence, earnings inequality has unambiguously increased since the 1980. By contrast, downward 
dominance of second degree is necessary to consistently rank 1980 as more equal than 1990, 2000 and 
2005 in terms of income. From Panel 3, it is clear that 1990 first-degree dominates 2000, both for 
earnings and income. Yet for earnings, more restrictive social preferences are required to 
unambiguously rank 1990 and 2005. The same holds when comparing 2000 and 2005 in Panel 4: 
While 2000 first-degree dominates 2005 for income, downward dominance of second degree is 
necessary for 2000 to dominate 2005 and upward dominance of tenth degree is required for 2005 to 
dominate 2000 in terms of earnings.  
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Table 1. Dominance results for Lorenz curves in income and earnings, 1970-2005 
 Earnings Income 
  Upward Downward Upward Downward 
Panel 1: Base year: 1970 
1970-1980 1970: 22+ degree  1980: 2 degree 1970: 22+ degree 1980: 2 degree 
1970-1990 1970: 2 degree 1990: 7 degree 1990: 22+degree 1970: 2 degree 
1970-2000 1970: 1 degree 1970: 1 degree 1970: 1 degree 1970: 1 degree 
1970-2005 1970: 1 degree 1970: 1 degree 1970: 1 degree 1970: 1 degree 
All (max) 22+ degree 7 degree 22+ degree 2 degree 
Panel 2: Base year: 1980 
1980-1990 1980: 1 degree 1980: 1 degree 1990: 22+ degree 1980: 2 degree 
1980-2000 1980: 1 degree 1980: 1 degree 2000: 22+ degree 1980: 2 degree 
1980-2005 1980: 1 degree 1980: 1 degree 2005: 22+ degree 1980: 2 degree 
All (max) 1 degree 1 degree 22+ degree 2 degree 
Panel 3: Base year: 1990 
1990-2000 1990: 1 degree 1990: 1 degree 1990: 1 degree 1990: 1 degree 
1990-2005 2005: 19 degree 1990: 2 degree 1990: 1 degree 1990: 1 degree 
All (max) 19 degree 2 degree 1 degree 1 degree 
Panel 4: Base year: 2000 
2000-2005 2005: 10 degree 2000: 2 degree 2000: 1 degree 2000: 1 degree 
All (max) 10 degree 2 degree 1 degree 1 degree 
Notes: Panel 1 compares the Lorenz curve in 1970 to the Lorenz curves in 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2005. Panel 2 
compares the Lorenz curve in 1980 to the Lorenz curves in 1990, 2000, and 2005. Panel 3 compares the Lorenz curve in 
1990 to the Lorenz curves in 2000 and 2005. Panel 4 compares the Lorenz curve in 2000 to the Lorenz curves in 2005. 
In each panel, the first column states the years of comparison, columns 2 and 3 report upward and downward 
dominance results for earnings, and columns 4-5 report dominance results for income. For every dominance results, we 
first report the year that dominates and then the order of dominance. The rows denoted All(max) report the maximum 
order of dominance for the all the years compared to the chosen base year. We only report dominance up to a maximum 
of 22 degree.   
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Table 2.  Distributional weight of inequality measures by degree of upward and downward 
Lorenz dominance   
Panel A: Gk Upward Lorenz 
dom. of order k P’1k(.01)/ 
P’1k(.5) 
P’1k(.05)/ 
P’1k(.5) 
P’1k(.3)/ P’1k(.5) P’1k(.7)/ 
P’1k(.5) 
P’1k(.95)/ 
P’1k(.5) 
k = 1 1,98 1,90 1,40 0,60 0,10 
k = 2 3,92 3,61 1,96 0,36 0,01 
k = 10 926 613 29 0 0 
k = 19 433150 197842 598 0 0 
k = 22 3362282 1356998 1640 0 0 
Panel B: Dk Downward Lorenz 
dom. of order k P’2k(.01)/ 
P’2k(.5) 
P’2k(.05)/ 
P’2k(.5) 
P’2k(.3)/ P’2k(.5) P’2k(.7)/  P’2k 
(.5) 
P’2k(.95)/ 
P’2k(.5) 
k = 1 1,98 1,90 1,40 0,60 0,10 
k = 2 1,33 1,33 1,21 0,68 0,13 
k = 7 1,01 1,01 1,01 0,92 0,30 
k = 22 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,68 
Notes: Panel A considers upwards Lorenz dominates, whereas Panel B considers downward Lorenz dominance. 
In each panel, the first column states the degree of dominance, and columns 2-5 compute the weight-functions of 
the generalized Gini families of inequality measures according to their relationship to Lorenz dominance of 
various degrees. Specifically, column 2 reports the ratio of the weights of the median individual compared to the 
1 percent poorest, column 3 reports the ratio of the weights of the median individual compared to the 5 percent 
poorest, column 4 reports the ratio of the weights of the median individual compared to the 30 percent poorest, 
column 5 reports the ratio of the weights of the median individual compared to the 30 percent richest, and 
column 6 reports the ratio of the weights of the median individual compared to the 5 percent richest.. The 
weight-function P’1k(u) of Gk is defined in equation (11) for j = 1, while the weight function P’2k(u) of Dk is 
defined in equation (13) for j = 1.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Because Lorenz curves often intersect, other approaches than first-degree Lorenz dominance are called 
for. Although the theoretical literature offers more general dominance criteria for ranking Lorenz 
curves,13 these methods are generally viewed as hard to implement and the results difficult to interpret 
because they involve assumptions about third and higher derivatives (see e.g. Atkinson, 2003). Thus, 
most empirical studies rely exclusively on one or a few summary measures of inequality to achieve 
rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves. A concern is, however, that the conclusions reached are 
sensitive to the more or less arbitrary choice of inequality measures. The purpose of this paper has 
                                                     
13 See e.g. Kolm (1976), Shorrocks and Foster (1987), Davies and Hoy (1995), Zoli (1999) and Aaberge (2000, 2009). 
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been to bridge the wide gap between the theoretical and the empirical strand of the literature 
concerned with rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves.  
 
We first arrange the members of generalized Gini families of inequality measures into subfamilies 
according to their relationship to Lorenz dominance of various degrees. Since the various criteria of 
higher degree Lorenz dominance provide convenient computational methods, these results can be used 
to identify the largest subfamily of the generalized Gini families and thus the least restrictive social 
preferences required to reach unambiguous ranking of a set of Lorenz curves. From the weight-
functions of these inequality measures we obtain intuitive interpretations of higher degree Lorenz 
dominance. To demonstrate the usefulness of these methods for empirical applications, we examine 
the time trend in income and earnings inequality of Norwegian males during the period 1967-2005. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.1A. The statement (i) implies (ii) follows from Theorem 2.2A of Aaberge 
(2009). 
 To prove the converse statement assume that (ii) holds and that L1 and L2 cross at u a . 
Then the following inequalities hold, 
(A1)  1 2
0
( ) ( ) 0
a
L u L u du    
and 
(A2)    1 1 2 2 1
0
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
2
L u L u du G L G L    .  
Since L1 and L2 cross only once (A1) and (A2) imply that 
    1 2
0
( ) ( ) 0 for all 0,1
u
L u L u du u     
and the inequality holds strictly for some u, and the desired result is obtained by applying Theorem 
2.2A of Aaberge (2009) . 
  
Proof of Proposition 2.2. The equivalence between (i) and (ii) follows by noting that 
 
     
     
1 1
1 2 2 1
1
2 1 1 2 1 2
0 0 0
1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
u u
u u
L t L t dt L t L t dt
L t L t dt L t L t dt L t L t dt
       
     
 
  
 
when L1 and L2 have equal Gini coefficients. 
 
As noted above the motivation for introducing the principles of DPTS (UPTS) was to successively 
strengthen the emphasis of transfers taking place lower down (higher up) in the income distribution. 
 
